

The Semantics of the Modal *Must* in a French Version of *Romeo and Juliet* by William Shakespeare

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Abstract

The modal 'must' have been used 41 times in the play with different flavours. Just like Kratzer, this paper stresses that 'must' is a neutral modal but the different meanings it takes in the French version are determined by the contexts. The conversational background, i.e. the modal base and the ordering source, is a key element that influences the meaning of the modal in a context. The different flavours of the modal include the deontic, the epistemic and the stereotypical. Modal logic shows that the context has a great importance in modal semantics, especially in cross-linguistic interpretation.

Keywords: Must, modal, modality, epistemic, deontic, flavour, context

Résumé

Le modal 'must' apparaît 41 fois dans la pièce avec des emplois différents. A l'instar de Kratzer, le présent article souligne le fait que 'must' est un modal neutre, mais les différentes significations qu'il prend dans la version française sont déterminées par différents contextes. La notion du « conversational background » développée par Kratzer, qui inclut deux autres notions, à savoir la « modal base » et l'« ordering source », est un élément clé qui influence la signification du modal en contexte. Les différents emplois du modal comprennent le déontique, l'épistémique et le stéréotypique. La logique modale montre l'importance du contexte en sémantique modale, surtout lorsqu'il s'agit d'interpréter d'une langue à l'autre.

Mots clés: *Must*, modal, modalité, épistémique, déontique, emploi, contexte

Introduction

The term “modal” is used in at least two different ways. Sometimes it is used to pick out a syntactic category, the Modal Auxiliaries may, might, can, could, should, would, must, and perhaps ought. Modals are traditionally thought to come in several semantic types, and certain of the auxiliary modals are ambiguous between two or more of these types. For example, must can be interpreted epistemically (“It must be, given what is known”), deontically (“You must do this, according to the laws”), teleologically (“You must do this in order to accomplish your goals”), and perhaps bouletically (“I must have this”). Another important modal type is dynamic or circumstantial modality, which refers to abilities and potentials.

Modality is the linguistic phenomenon whereby grammar allows one to say things about, or on the basis of, situations which need not be real. This is more of a pointer than a definition – Portner precedes it with the proviso “I am not too comfortable trying to define modality” – but it provides a reasonable characterization of modality as a semantic phenomenon. Construed this way, a wide variety of natural language expressions has modal semantics. Menéndez-Benito (2007:1) says that: “In a possible world semantics, modal expressions are treated as quantifiers over worlds.” Necessity modals (e.g. must) are universal quantifiers, while possibility modals (e.g. might, can) are existential quantifiers.

There is an abundant literature available on the notion of modality. In previous papers, I discussed the necessity and possibility modals as developed by Coates, Allen, Perkins and others. This paper focuses on the various interpretations of the meaning of the modal ‘*must*’ in the above-mentioned play and attempts to analyse these interpretations through the theory developed by Kratzer.

In addition to the the flavors such as epistemic and deontic that are frequently encountered in the literature available on modals, a new modal flavor (i.e. the circumstantial flavor) is introduced in the paper. In the next section, the problem statement will be formulated and the definitions of the terms such as modals, modality, and quantifiers over possible worlds will be given. Then, the theoretical framework of the paper will be presented and the interpretations of the modal ‘*must*’ into French will be discussed.

2. *The problem statement*

This paper deals with the notion of modality in a contrastive perspective and takes the view that ‘*must*’ is a neutral modal whose meanings are shaped by the context in which it is used. The elements that shape modal meaning in a context include the modal base and the ordering source (i. e. the conversational background). These two elements give modals different flavors (i.e. deontic, epistemic, circumstantial, etc.). Indeed, there are many interpretations of the modal ‘*must*’ in the French version of the play, however ‘*must*’ is supposed to have a single lexical entry. In the play, there are 41 occurrences of the modal ‘*must*’ and interestingly enough, its translation into French has led to a number of meanings which are determined by the contexts. Indeed, the modal ‘*must*’ is used to mark the future tense and to express necessity and wishes as well as moral or legal obligation, a duty, a command, determinism, want, etc. In order to understand this semantic phenomenon, the different flavors of the modal ‘*must*’ in the context of the play will be discussed as well as the conversational backgrounds. This is a concept developed by Kratzer in her theory of modal logic.

3. *The definitions of the terms modality, modal, and quantifiers over possible worlds*

3.1 Modality

From a speaker’s-evaluation approach, modality is the speaker’s cognitive, emotive, or volitive attitude toward a state of affairs. Modality is “another name for *mood*, but one applied more specially to certain distinctions concerned with the speaker’s estimate of the relation between the actor and the accomplishment of some event” (Trask). Mood is a formal verbal category while modalities have been treated primarily in terms of modal meaning. Modality may be expressed through verbs, adjectives, nouns, adverbs, particles, intonation.

Ruthrof (1991) sees modality as “the structurable field of the manners of speaking underlying all utterances” (this he also calls *covert or inferential modality*). This might be linked with ideas of perspective or style (cf. Saukkonen 1991).

Bybee & Fleischman (1995: 503-517) say that:

Modality... is the semantic domain pertaining to elements of meaning that languages express. It covers a broad range of semantic nuances - jussive, desiderative, intentive, hypothetical, potential, obligative, dubitative, hortatory, exclamative, etc. - whose common denominator is the addition of a supplement or overlay of meaning to the most neutral semantic value of the proposition of an utterance, namely factual and declarative’. Modality can be expressed in various ways, 'morphological, lexical, syntactic, or via intonation.

For Schneider (1999: 13) and Bybee (1985), modality (more clearly revealed in main clauses) consists of (i) speech acts (orders and wishes, i.e. deontic modality), and (ii) attitudes to truth-content of the sentence (i.e. epistemic modality). Modality is indicated by various means (subjunctive, modal verbs, parenthetical verbs, sentence adverbials, matrix verbs), but some of these (subjunctive, modal verbs) can also be found in object clauses with a merely syntactic function.

3.2 Modal

Semantically, modals are taken to be quantifiers over *possible worlds* (Kratzer 1981, 1991). Modals, modal auxiliaries, and modal verbs: a morphosyntactic approach to modality starts from the formal category of modal auxiliaries (Palmer, 1979: 4-5). However, modals are difficult to define and do not all share the same properties. Palmer says that English modals can be divided into (i) ‘central modals’ (*can, may, will, shall, must; could, might, would, should*), (ii) ‘marginal modals’ or ‘semi-modals’: (a) *dare, need, ought to, used to*; (b) *had better, would rather, be to, have (got) to*; (iii) *be about to, be bound to, be going to, be obliged to, be supposed to, be willing to, be able to*.

Kratzer (1991: 640) has developed a theory on different flavors of modality as follows:

- | | |
|------------------------------------|------------------|
| 10) John must have been the murder | [epistemic] |
| 11) John must go to jail | [deontic] |
| 12) John must sneeze | [circumstantial] |

The kind of modality involved can be specified overtly:

- 13) In view of the available evidence, John must have been the murderer
 14) In view of what the law provides, John must go to jail
 15) In view of the present state of his nose, John must sneeze.

The paraphrases above in 13), 14), 15) are not redundant. The **must** in these examples is a ‘neutral’ modal. “The existence of neutral modals suggests that non-neutral modals are not truly ambiguous. They just need a piece of information provided by the context of use.”

3.3 Quantifiers over possible worlds

Possible worlds are ways in which people could conceive the world to be different. These are the 'frameworks', 'contexts', 'worldviews', 'states of affairs', 'conceptual domains' or 'modalities' within which an event or proposition has a significance or truth value (Perkins, 1983: 8)

The classic analysis of modality treats modal expressions essentially as restricted quantifiers over possible worlds. The restriction is provided by an accessibility relation R , which comes in various types associated with the modal flavors (epistemic, doxastic, deontic, bouletic, dynamic, etc.).

Kratzer (1981, 1991) presents a revised modal logic and retains the assumption that most modal expressions are as restricted universal or existential quantifiers over accessible worlds, but her modals have much more complicated restrictions than in standard modal logic. This allows Kratzer to give reasonable truth-conditions for intermediate grades of modality, as well as modal comparatives. Kratzer’s semantics for modality relies on an ordering of comparative possibility on worlds, denoted $\geq_g(w)$. This order is derived from the interaction of two contextual parameters: a modal base f and an ordering source g . Modal operator are interpreted with respect to two conversational backgrounds: a modal base and an ordering source. The modal base determines for every world the set of worlds that are accessible from it, while the ordering source imposes a partial order on the set of worlds selected by the modal base.

For a concrete example, suppose that we have three norms in play, and a domain of worlds which have the following properties:

NORMS:

- N1. Children obey their parents.
 N2. No trespassing.
 N3. No murder.

- w1: N1-N3 is obeyed.
 w2: Only N1 violated.
 w3: Only N2 violated.
 w4: Only N3 violated.
 w5: Only N1 and N2 violated.
 w6: Only N1 and N3 violated.
 w7: Only N2 and N3 violated.
 w8: N1, N2, and N3 all violated.

This example gives us a relation of comparative possibility $g(w)$. In the first example, the best world was the one where no norms were violated, w1. In the second and third examples, the best worlds are the worlds which violate the fewest norms: w2, w3, and w4. This way of ordering worlds in terms of their closeness to an ideal makes some intuitive sense for deontic modals. Kratzer (1981) suggests that, for epistemic modals, the ordering source is composed of propositions representing the “normal state of affairs”.

4. *The Theoretical Framework and various occurrences of the modal must and their interpretations into French*

Given that Kratzer's theory of modal logic is the background against which this study is going to be conducted, it is critically important to shed some light on it.

First try

In Kratzer's system, each modal auxiliary has a single lexical entry, which provides its quantificational force (existential or universal). These quantifiers are restricted by a conversational background, a *modal base*, which is contextually determined, and which can be brought about by phrases such as *in view of what the law says*.

Let's start with an example given by Kratzer and discussed by Lassiter D. (2011) in *Measurement and Modality : The Scalar Basis of Modal Semantics*.

(1) In view of what the law says, Jane must not steal

The sentence in (1) does not mean that Jane does not steal in reality; she may be a convicted felon, and (1) would still be judged true. Instead, the modal allows us to talk about ideal situations: in our case, we want our modal to quantify over worlds in which the law is obeyed. The background here is what the law says. Thus, we could have a modal base f deontic (w), which is a set of propositions, such that each of these propositions expresses the content of a law in the base world w : e.g., there is no thief in w . In all of the worlds where the law is obeyed, Jane does not steal.

So far, so good. However, such a modal base is not sufficient, especially for deontic cases. Problems arise when the law is broken. Imagine that Jane actually steals. Then, according to the law:

(2) Jane must go to jail

The problem is that our body of laws and regulations already excluded worlds in which there are thieves. Thus in all worlds in which the law is obeyed, Jane does not go to jail, because in all of these worlds, there is no crime. To get out of this conundrum, Kratzer proposes a second conversational background, the *ordering source*, which orders the worlds of the modal base according to an ideal, set by a body of laws. It is now the ordering source which gives the modal its deontic flavor. The modal base, on the other hand, will now be 'circumstantial': it will be made up of the set of relevant facts of the base world w . It will notably contain the fact that Jane stole. The ordering source will be a set of propositions L , which describe a body of laws (e.g. there are no thieves, there is no murder, thieves go to jail, murderers go to jail...). This set of propositions L will impose the following ordering:

(3) Ordering \leq_L :

For all worlds $w, z \in W$: $w \leq_L z$ iff $\{p: p \in L \text{ and } z \in L\} \subseteq \{p: p \in L \text{ and } w \in L\}$

The ordering states that a world w will be more ideal than a world z , if more of the propositions in set L hold in w than in z . Thus, the best worlds according to this ordering source will be those in which no law is broken. A slightly less ideal world will have one law broken (e.g. Jane stole), but the others obeyed (Jane goes to jail), etc. Given that the circumstantial modal base returns a set of worlds in which Jane stole, the best worlds in this set will be those in which there is a thief, Jane, but where she goes to jail (i.e. one of the propositions in L doesn't hold, but the others do).

To sum up, the modal *must* is a universal quantifié over possible worlds. With a deontic interpretation, it is first restricted by a *circumstantial* modal base $f(w)$, which returns a set of worlds in which certain facts in w hold (e.g. Jane stole a car). The set of worlds given by $f(w)$ are then ordered by an ordering source $g(w)$, according to an ideal provided by the law. Note that both $f(w)$ and $g(w)$ are contextually determined. This allows for a single entry for *must*:

(4) For any world w , there are conversational backgrounds f, g , and proposition q .

Let us now give an example of context in which the modal 'must' has a deontic flavour in the play.

4.1 An example of context in which the modal *must* has been used to express the imperative mood and a command

LADY CAPULET - He is a kinsman to the Montague; affection makes him false; he speaks not true: Some twenty of them fought in this black strife, And all those twenty could but kill one life. I beg for justice, which thou, prince, **must** give; Romeo slew Tybalt, Romeo **must** not live. (P.88)

Lady Capulet, désignant Benvolio. – Il est parent des Montagues ; l'affection le fait mentir, il ne dit pas la vérité ! Une vingtaine d'entre eux se sont ligués pour cette lutte criminelle, et il a fallu qu'ils fussent vingt pour tuer un seul homme ! Je demande justice, **fais-nous** justice, Prince. Roméo a tué Tybalt ; Roméo **ne doit** plus vivre. (P.73)

In Kratzer's theory, a conversational background is the sort of thing that is identified by phrases like **what the law provides, what we know**. In this case, we can assume that the law (or the prince) states that nobody should kill; anybody who kills must be killed. What we know is that 'Romeo slew Tybalt'. Given that the prince (the ordering source) states that 'anybody who kills must be killed', then 'Romeo must be killed'. The modal 'must' in this case has a deontic flavour. The translator is quite right using the verb '*devoir*' as an equivalent of the modal 'must' in this context.

Regarding the first use of the modal 'must' in this context, in 'I beg for justice, which thou, prince, must give', the prince is summoned to do justice. The imperative '*fais*' is like an order. The modal base is known, so is the ordering source. 'Must' has a deontic flavor, which is also the case in the next section.

4.2 An example of context in which the modal *must* has been used to express a legal obligation

ROMEO

'Tis torture, and not mercy: heaven is here,
Where Juliet lives; and every cat and dog
And little mouse, every unworthy thing,
Live here in heaven and may look on her;
But Romeo may not: more validity,
More honourable state, more courtship lives
In carrion-flies than Romeo: they my seize
On the white wonder of dear Juliet's hand
And steal immortal blessing from her lips,
Who even in pure and vestal modesty,
Still blush, as thinking their own kisses sin;
But Romeo may not; he is banished:
Flies may do this, but I from this **must** fly:
They are free men, but I am banished. (Scene III, P.96)

Roméo. – C'est une torture, et non une grâce ! Le ciel est là où vit Juliette : un chat, un chien, une petite souris, l'être le plus immonde, vivent dans le paradis et peuvent la contempler, mais Roméo ne le peut pas. La mouche du charnier est plus privilégiée, plus comblée d'honneur, plus favorisée que Roméo ; elle peut saisir les blanches merveilles de la chère main de Juliette, et dérober une immortelle béatitude sur ces lèvres qui, dans leur pure et vestale modestie, rougissent sans cesse, comme d'un péché, du baiser qu'elles se donnent ! Mais Roméo ne le peut pas, il est exilé. Ce bonheur que la mouche peut avoir, je **dois** le fuir, moi ; elle est libre, mais je suis banni. (Scène III, P.81)

As stated above, 'Romeo slew Tybalt' and 'must fly'. Fleeing Verona became an obligation for Romeo because of the ordering source: 'Romeo is banished' (i.e. the decree of the prince). The banishment of Romeo is what the law provides in this case. The modal must has a deontic flavor. 'Must' expresses a strong obligation. In the next example, it expresses an order.

4.3 An example of context in which the modal *must* has been used to express an order

JULIET

Now, by Saint Peter's Church and Peter too,
He shall not make me there a joyful bride.
I wonder at this haste; that I **must** wed
Ere he, that should be husband, comes to woo.
I pray you, tell my lord and father, madam,
I will not marry yet; and, when I do, I swear,
It shall be Romeo, whom you know I hate,
Rather than Paris. These are news indeed! (P.111)

Juliette. – Oh ! par l'église de Saint-Pierre et par Saint Pierre lui-même, il ne fera pas de moi sa joyeuse épouse. Je m'étonne de tant de hâte : **ordonner** ma noce, avant que celui qui doit être mon mari m'ait fait sa cour ! Je vous en prie, madame, dites à mon seigneur et père que je ne veux pas me marier encore. Si jamais je me marie, je le jure, ce sera plutôt à ce Roméo que vous savez haï de moi, qu'au comte Paris. Voilà des nouvelles en vérité. (P.92)

As stated above, the modal base is about the facts. In this case, the fact is that Juliet is expected at Saint Peter's Church to marry Paris on Thursday. The ordering source is 'what the law provides'. In this case, Juliet's father ordered that she must marry Paris. Her father's order is the ordering source. The modal 'must' expresses a moral obligation which the French version of the play expresses through the use of the verb '*ordonner*'. The modal 'must' has a deontic flavour, which it also has in the next example.

4.4 An example of context in which the modal *must* has been used to express necessity

Servant

Find them out whose names are written here! It is written, that the shoemaker should meddle with his yard, and the tailor with his last, the fisher with his pencil, and the painter with his nets; but I am sent to find those persons whose names are here writ, and can never find what names the writing person hath here writ. I **must** to the learned.—In good time.

Enter BENVOLIO and ROMEO (Scene 2, P.20)

Le Valet, *seul, les yeux fixés sur le papier* –

Trouver les gens dont les noms sont écrits ici ? Il est écrit... que le cordonnier doit se servir de son aune, le tailleur de son alêne, le pêcheur de ses pinceaux et le peintre de ses filets ; mais moi, on veut que j'aie trouver les personnes dont les noms sont écrits ici, quand je ne peux même pas trouver quels noms a écrits ici l'écrivain ! **II faut** que je m'adresse aux savants... Heureuse rencontre !

Entrent Benvolio et Roméo. (P.19)

The modal base is that the servant has to take invitations to the people whose names are written on the paper given to him by the Capulets but he cannot read the names. Therefore, '*it is necessary for*' him to seek assistance from people who can read the names. This is a case of 'Root Must', according to Coates' taxonomy (1968: 32). The translation of the modal 'must' by the verb '*falloir*' in this context is in order.

The following examples will reveal different flavours of the modal 'must' because different contexts yield different modal flavours.

Second try

As indicated above, for Kratzer, there are two kinds of modal bases. First is the *epistemic* one, which picks the set of world's compatible with the speaker's knowledge (or that of a larger community) in *w*. The second is the *circumstantial* modal base. To get at the contrast between the two modal bases, consider the pair of examples below. English *might* and *can* help bring out this contrast, as they each have some selectional constraints which forces *might* and disallows *can* to select an epistemic modal base.

- (5) a. Hydrangeas might grow here.
b. Hydrangeas can grow here. [Kratzer (1981)]

The sentence in (a) is evaluated against an epistemic modal base: To the best of my knowledge, it is possible that hydrangeas grow here. The sentence in (b) is evaluated against a circumstantial modal base, that is, one which picks out worlds in which certain facts of the world hold. Such facts will include the quality of the soil, the climate, etc. While the difference in meaning might seem subtle, they actually yield different truth conditions. If I know for a fact that there are no hydrangeas in this part of the country, (a) will be false; however, the circumstances for hydrangeas to grow might still be ideal, and the sentence in (b) will then be true.

Kratzer (1991: 646) explains the difference between the circumstantial and the epistemic flavors as follows: "Suppose I acquire a piece of land in a far away country and discover that soil and climate are very much like at home, where hydrangeas prosper everywhere. Since hydrangeas are my favorite plants, I wonder whether they would grow in this place and inquire about it. The answer is (a). In such a situation, the proposition expressed by (a) is true. It is true regardless of whether it is or isn't likely that there are already hydrangeas in the country we are considering. All that matters is climate, soil, the special properties of hydrangeas, and the like. Suppose now that the country we are in has never had any contacts whatsoever with Asia or America, and the vegetation is altogether different from ours. Given this evidence, my utterance of (b) would express a false proposition. What counts here is the complete evidence available. In addition, this evidence is not compatible with the existence of hydrangeas. (a) Together with our scenario illustrates the pure circumstantial reading of the modal *can*. The pure circumstantial reading of modals is characterized by a circumstantial modal base and an empty ordering source."

That is how Kratzer explains circumstantial modal reading. In other words, given the nature and characteristics of hydrangeas, they can grow in this country where the climate and the soil as well as other properties are very much like at home. In the next section, the difference between circumstantial modal reasoning and epistemic modal reasoning is made clear. Kratzer (Ibid.) says that:

"(b) together with our scenario illustrates the epistemic reading of modals (the ordering source may or may not be empty here.) Circumstantial and epistemic conversational backgrounds involve different kinds of facts. In using an epistemic modal, we are interested in what else may or must be the case in our world given all the evidence available. "

- Circumstantial modal base picks out worlds in which certain relevant facts or circumstances hold. E.g., climate, soil, special properties of hydrangeas.
- Epistemic modal base picks out worlds compatible with all the evidence available.

To sum up, Kratzer shows that the different meanings that arise with modals can vary along three dimensions: the **force** (existential or universal), which is lexically determined; the **modal base**, which is either circumstantial (the modal base involved in all root modals) or epistemic. Finally, there is the **ordering source**, which follows the template in (3), and where what changes from one ordering source to the next is the set of propositions that establishes the ordering: deontic (laws), bouletic (wishes), teleological (aims), stereotypical (normal course of events). Both the modal base and the ordering source are contextually given, and not all combinations of modal bases and ordering sources are possible.

Due to the constraints of space, it would not be possible to show all the 41 contexts in which the modal 'must' has been found in the play. However, at least one example of each of the above-mentioned meanings of the modal will be given. The next example is a case of bouletic flavour.

4.5 An example of context in which the modal *must* has been used to express a wish

MERCUTIO - Nay, gentle Romeo, we must have you dance. (Scene IV, P.29) **Mercutio**. – Ah ! mon doux Roméo, nous voulions que vous dansiez. (P.26)

'Must' in this case has a bouletic flavor, according to the different modal flavours mentioned above. Mercutio expressed a wish. He wanted Romeo to dance. In the next example, the same modal 'must' has a similar flavour.

4.6 An example of context in which the modal *must* has been used to express a wish and/or a belief

ROMEO

Then plainly know my heart's dear love is set
On the fair daughter of rich Capulet:
As mine on hers, so hers is set on mine;
And all combined, save what thou must combine
By holy marriage: when and where and how
We met, we woo'd and made exchange of vow,
I'll tell thee as we pass; but this I pray,
That thou consent to marry us to-day. (P.58)

Roméo. – Apprends-le donc tout net, j'aime d'un amour profond la fille charmante du riche Capulet. Elle a fixé mon cœur comme j'ai fixé le sien ; pour que notre union soit complète, il ne nous manque que d'être unis par toi dans le saint mariage. Quand, où et comment nous nous sommes vus, aimés et fiancés, je te le dirai chemin faisant ; mais, avant tout, je t'en prie, consens à nous marier aujourd'hui même. (P.49-50)

The modal base is that Romeo is requesting Friar Lawrence to celebrate his marriage with Juliet. 'Must' does not have a deontic flavour. The use of the verb '*manquer*' as the equivalent of the modal 'must' expresses a wish. Romeo could as well say 'I wish you celebrated our marriage'. In any case, he went to see friar Lawrence to beg him to celebrate his marriage with Juliet. Having said that, we need to point out that modal logic provides room for interpretations. 'Must' may as well reflect the need for Romeo to get the sacrament of marriage from the Friar. In this case, it is his belief in holy marriage that needs to be put forward. Most of the time, translators have a lot of options and they take the one that is the most appropriate, according to them. The translator has had another option in the next example.

4.7 Examples of contexts in which the modal *must* has been used to mark the future tense

GREGORY

They **must** take it in sense that feels it.

(Scene 1, p. 6)

Black and portentous **must** this humour prove,
Unless good counsel may the cause, remove. (Scene 1,
P.12)

Grégoire. – Celles-là comprendront la chose qui la
sentiront. (Scène 1, p. 9)

Ah ! cette humeur sombre lui sera fatale, si de bons
conseils n'en dissipent
la cause. (P.14)

In their conversation, Gregory is telling Samson that he will be very brutal with the Montagues because they are not friends with the Capulets. What does 'must' mean in this sentence? 'Must' does not have a deontic flavour. The modal base is that the Montagues and the Capulets are enemies. Is this enough to say that 'must' has a circumstantial flavour in this case? Modal reasoning in this case would have it that 'given the rivalry between the Montagues and the Capulets, Gregory cannot be friendly to a member of the Montague family'. The use of the future tense in French to interpret the meaning of *must* is acceptable. In a comment on the meaning of the modal *must*, Allen says in *Living English Structure* that the modal *must* is used to refer to the future as well. It confirms the idea that modals are a semantic phenomenon.

In the second example, Benvolio is talking about Romeo's sad mood with Montague, Romeo's father who says that if his son does not listen to good advice, his sadness will inexorably become fatal. Modal reasoning can be expressed as follows: 'In view of Romeo's current behaviour, his humour must prove portentous.' This is circumstantial modal reasoning. In other words, the circumstances are such that Romeo's mood will prove fatal if he does not listen to good advice. 'Must' in this case has a circumstantial flavour'. Though it is not wrong to use the future tense to interpret the meaning of 'must', it is important to point out that the use of '*sera*' is not enough to stress the inevitability and certainty of the impending disaster.

In the next example, the modal flavour is rather epistemic.

4.8 An example of context in which the modal *must* has been used to express a sort of determinism and faith

JULIET

What **must** be shall be. (P.118)

Juliette. – Ce qui **doit** être, sera. (P.99)

The modal base is that Paris and Juliet are supposed to wed on Thursday. When Paris announces to Juliet that she must become his wife on Thursday, she says surprisingly that 'what must be shall be'. Juliet is surprised because she is already married to Romeo but Paris and her parents do not know. As stated above, the ordering source is the unilateral decision or order of Juliet's father to marry her off to Paris without her consent. Juliet is under a moral obligation to marry Paris. Shakespeare's plays were written in a conservative society. The marriage is being imposed on her and she openly takes a fatalistic attitude towards it without revealing her inner feelings to Paris. The modal 'must' has an epistemic flavour in this example because it expresses Juliet's apparent faith in the inevitability of what must happen. Let us not forget that she is acting. She is pretending to agree with Paris' proposal. In so doing, she gives Paris the impression that he is perhaps predestined to marry her. Was it not what Paris wanted to hear?

Conclusion

Modal logic enables speakers to express different world views and to imagine many possible worlds. Modals are quantifiers over possible worlds. The notion of modality is gradable. Just like Kratzer, this paper has taken the view that the modal 'must' has a single lexical entry; however, it has different flavours which are contextually determined. The modal base and the ordering source assist in selecting the most probable meaning a modal has in a given context. Indeed, 'must' has a number of flavours in different contexts in the play under review. The exploration of modal logic is a kind of study which reveals the great importance of the context in translation studies. The different flavours of the modal 'must' contribute to dramatise this love story.

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